-------------------------------------------------------------------
Alatorre Accused Of Using Drugs With City Contractor Officials
('Los Angeles Times' Says Los Angeles City Councilman Richard Alatorre
Repeatedly Used Cocaine With A Friend And Convicted Narcotics Offender
While Aggressively Helping Him Obtain Government Business,
According To Allegations Contained In Court Documents
And Supported By Interviews)
Date: Thu, 04 Jun 1998 00:40:10 -0400
To: mapnews@mapinc.org
From: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org (MAPNews)
Subject: MN: US CA: Alatorre Accused Of Using Drugs
With City Contractor Officials
Sender: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org
Reply-To: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org
Newshawk: Jim Rosenfield
Pubdate: Wed, 03 Jun 1998
Source: Los Angeles Times (CA)
Contact: letters@latimes.com
Website: http://www.latimes.com/
Author: Robert J. Lopez, Rich Connell,
Times Staff Writers
ALATORRE ACCUSED OF USING DRUGS WITH CITY CONTRACTOR OFFICIALS
Councilman allegedly steered government work toward businessman. Both have
denied wrongdoing.
Los Angeles City Councilman Richard Alatorre repeatedly used cocaine with a
friend and convicted narcotics offender while aggressively helping him
obtain government business, according to allegations contained in court
documents and supported by interviews.
Alatorre's ties to Julian G. Carrasco date back more than 20 years, when the
waste hauler and demolition specialist pleaded guilty to possessing and
intending to distribute heroin. More recently, the lives of the two men have
been entwined in ways that have prompted questions of propriety by
government officials and business associates involved in their dealings.
Among other things, documents and interviews disclose that Alatorre wielded
his influence in the early and mid-1990s to help Carrasco obtain government
contracts, at least twice over the objections of civil servants who believed
that public money was being jeopardized.
This occurred at a time when the councilman was regularly showing up at
Carrasco's office in Vernon, where the men allegedly shared cocaine on the
contractor's glass desktop. In addition, the company's former controller
says Carrasco directed him to write a $2,000 corporate check to the
councilman but he balked, prompting his boss to instead withdraw cash from a
personal account. The controller says he does not know where that money
ended up.
Alatorre, through a spokesperson on Tuesday, refused to comment on any
aspect of his relationship with Carrasco. In the past, he has issued general
denials of any misconduct in his personal or public life.
Carrasco, for his part, flatly disputed the allegations, saying in an
interview Tuesday that cocaine "has been out of my life for a long time" and
that he has never used the drug "with anyone other than myself." He said he
has no knowledge of whether Alatorre has used drugs.
Carrasco said he and the councilman have been "longtime, loyal friends" but
that he did not exploit the relationship for financial gain. He said each of
his many government contracts was awarded on merit alone.
Carrasco blamed unhappy former employees for the accusations leveled against
him and Alatorre, a man he calls "a peoples' politician." "Everyone has
employees that for whatever reasons . . . will say whatever comes to their
minds," he said.
The latest questions swirling around Alatorre come from disparate
sources--ranging from records in unconnected court cases to interviews with
disaffected former Carrasco employees and front-line public workers.
Taken together, they also appear to bolster accounts by a woman who came
forward earlier this year with similar allegations--Alatorre's former
executive secretary.
In recent court documents, she accused the councilman of abusing cocaine and
showing up at City Hall with wads of $100 bills after meetings with
supporters, up to the time she left in 1995.
Linda M. Ward's sworn statement, lodged in a bitter custody case involving
the Alatorres' niece, has been disparaged by the councilman as lies by a
vindictive ex-girlfriend and disgruntled former employee.
Alatorre has told reporters that the white powder she claims to have seen on
his nostrils and clothes might have been dandruff, denture powder or
Doritos. The councilman also has insisted that he has not abused any
substance since undergoing treatment for alcoholism 10 years ago.
Some of those new accusations have emerged in the custody battle, which has
been transformed into an assault on Alatorre's parental fitness. The
Superior Court action was brought by longtime political rival Henry Lozano,
who is seeking custody of his 9-year-old daughter, now living with the
Alatorres.
Like Ward, Carrasco's former secretary alleged in a sworn statement filed in
the custody case that the councilman abused drugs--an open secret, she said,
among the firm's employees. "It was well known throughout the office staff
that the councilman's visits were for cocaine," Beverly Vasquez-Bumgardner said.
One of those in the know was the ex-foreman of Carrasco's now-defunct JCI
Environmental Services.
In a signed declaration provided to The Times, Donald Benefield said he
witnessed Alatorre preparing or using cocaine with Carrasco about half a
dozen times during a several-year period ending in 1995, when the business
shut down.
Benefield recalled one Saturday when Carrasco left his office door open. He
said he saw Alatorre hunched over, inhaling one of several neatly aligned
rows of white powder through a small tube.
"He sniffed it up at the glass desk, right there," Benefield said in an
interview.
Last year, the relationship between the contractor and the councilman became
part of an FBI investigation into whether Carrasco's JCI was improperly
dumping hazardous waste. Three former JCI employees told The Times that
federal agents asked them whether their boss was supplying drugs and money
to Alatorre.
Carrasco said he had no knowledge of the investigation, in which no charges
have been filed. It is unclear what, if any, information gathered in that
investigation is being cycled into a current federal corruption probe of
Alatorre.
Among other things, Alatorre, who also is a board member of the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, is under investigation by the FBI and Internal
Revenue Service for allegedly receiving cash from people with government
business and for obtaining help in the purchase and remodeling of his Eagle
Rock home--including the falsification of financial records and the
financing of a $12,000 tile roof by a prominent government contractor.
Long Relationship With Businessman Carrasco, 55, was an enterprising
businessman who favored a lavish lifestyle. He wore a gold pinkie ring with
a diamond in the middle and had a penchant for expensive cars. He also had a
grand business vision: to join the ranks of Los Angeles' giant public works
contractors.
To boost his big-league image and highlight his Mexican heritage, Carrasco's
JCI sponsored an award-winning float in the 1995 Rose Parade. The creation,
featuring huge Aztec handball players, was promoted in a glossy company
brochure picturing Carrasco with Alatorre.
But even as he was striving for recognition, Carrasco's finances were
unraveling. In the spring of 1995, JCI filed for bankruptcy protection,
leaving employees unpaid and creditors in line. One of them: the builder of
his heralded float.
Carrasco said he is now a partner in a local manufacturing company and does
various kinds of consulting work.
Alatorre's relationship with Carrasco extends at least to the lawmaker's
early years in the Assembly, in the mid-1970s.
Carrasco has said Alatorre has written him letters of reference for public
contracts, attesting "to my character." Their relationship also predates
Carrasco's 1977 arrest for allegedly arranging the sale of a kilogram of
heroin to a federal agent in the El Monte area, according to federal court
records.
Prosecutors alleged that he was part of a conspiracy to distribute heroin in
Southern California.
He pleaded guilty to a single count of possession with intent to distribute
the drug, and was sentenced to two years in federal prison.
After his release, Carrasco returned to the waste hauling and demolition
business he had begun in the late 1960s. But he had not left his drug days
behind, according to former employees.
"Mr. Carrasco was not discreet about his use of cocaine in the office during
my tenure," the businessman's former secretary, Vasquez-Bumgardner, said in
court records. "He was clearly addicted, and his nose required
reconstructive surgery on several occasions due to his overuse of cocaine."
During this time, Vasquez-Bumgardner and other former JCI employees said,
Alatorre's was a familiar face around the office, located in an industrial
area beyond the councilman's Eastside district. He dropped by on workdays
and on weekends, they said, staying anywhere from five minutes to an hour.
Vasquez-Bumgardner also said her boss "bragged" about his relationship with
the councilman--and the benefits that accrued to both of them. Carrasco
openly implied that Alatorre helped him obtain government business because
he supplied the lawmaker with drugs, she said in the custody case document.
"Councilman Alatorre will do whatever I tell him, because he needs me," the
secretary quoted Carrasco as saying--a statement Carrasco denies making.
On "many occasions," Vasquez-Bumgardner said in her court statement, she
could hear Alatorre and Carrasco snorting cocaine.
She described a morning in 1994 when Alatorre walked out of Carrasco's
office after a "snorting session" with cocaine "around his nostrils and all
over his pants." "I said, 'Richard, you have powder on your pants!' He said,
'Thanks, Beverly,' and proceeded to wipe himself down." Standing nearby was
the firm's foreman.
"It looked like somebody had been eating a white doughnut," recalled
Benefield who, like other employees, said he is angry with Carrasco for
failing to pay him thousands of dollars in salary when the firm went under.
The councilman's visits became more frequent in the couple of years before
JCI's 1995 closure, Benefield said.
"I'd just see them in there, getting their drugs together," he said. "It was
a common thing between two buddies." Another former JCI employee, who
requested anonymity, said it was hard to forget some of Alatorre's visits.
One weekend morning in the summer of 1994, he said, the councilman arrived
"stumbling, smelling like alcohol." After about an hour in Carrasco's
office, the councilman emerged "completely re-energized." "You could see the
powder in his nose," the worker said.
Both Carrasco and Alatorre were questioned about their relationship and
visits in depositions taken in 1994 during a sexual harassment suit filed by
Carrasco's secretary, Vasquez-Bumgardner. Neither of the men, however, was
asked about drugs.
Carrasco testified that Alatorre would visit in "spurts"--sometimes up to
three times a week--to discuss his political ambitions and ways they could
improve the community.
Alatorre, in his deposition, said he could not remember exactly why he paid
calls to Carrasco or how often. "I visit a lot of people," he said. "I may
have visited, stopped by and bullshit with the guy." Alatorre's visits,
according to JCI's former controller, were often accompanied by another
ritual: requests by Carrasco for money from the firm.
Financial officer Andrew Lee told The Times that he was instructed by
Carrasco in 1992 to write Alatorre a company check for approximately $2,000.
As Alatorre waited in Carrasco's office, Lee said he told his boss it would
be improper to put corporate funds in a politician's pocket.
"He wouldn't give a reason what it was for," said Lee, now an accountant for
the MTA. "He just said, 'I owe him some money.' " Lee said he was then told
to prepare a check--payable to cash--from Carrasco's personal account. After
doing so, Lee said, his involvement ended and he is uncertain where the
money went.
More often, Lee said, his boss would ask him to dip into the company's petty
cash before or during Alatorre's visits, withdrawing between $100 and $200
each time. He said the two men would then sometimes leave in the
councilman's car and return a short time later.
Carrasco disputes Lee's account, saying he never provided the councilman
with any money and never requested that cash be made available before or
during his visits.
"Of course not," he said.
Connections to Contracts Whatever the attraction between the men, Alatorre
repeatedly used his considerable political influence to help his friend
obtain more than $2 million in local government contracts.
The lawmaker acknowledged in his 1994 deposition that Carrasco often sought
his advice and help. "He's had a lot of business problems," Alatorre said.
One was at the city's Department of Water and Power.
Carrasco's firm had won a 1993 bid to demolish an old DWP service center
east of downtown for a fee of $443,000. But a conflict erupted: Warner Bros.
wanted to blow up the building for a Sylvester Stallone film, "Demolition
Man." Because the job requirements had changed, DWP staffers urged that
Carrasco's contract be terminated and that the job be rebid after the movie
makers had finished, when the exact nature of the work would be more clear.
With that looming prospect, Alatorre personally intervened with then-DWP
General Manager Daniel Waters, according to a source knowledgeable about the
events. Soon after, Waters overruled his staff and allowed Carrasco's
contract to proceed as negotiated, the source said, adding: "You know,
Councilman Alatorre is pretty powerful. . . . [Waters] understood the
reality of it." Waters acknowledged in an interview that he probably
discussed the contract with Alatorre but said he could recall no specifics.
He said that whatever actions he took were in the utility's best interest.
Carrasco agrees. He credits Alatorre with helping to ensure that the lowest
and best bid won the day.
"He did the right thing," Carrasco said of the councilman. "I just told him
what was going on. . . . All he did was relay the information that I told
him." As it turned out, Carrasco would try to obtain even more money from
the city after Warner Bros. had demolished some of the building--and before
he had even started his own work.
As DWP staffers had feared, the Carrasco contract had left an opening for
confusion and bickering. Carrasco informed the department that he wanted an
extra $154,000 because the work had been made more difficult by the studio's
partial demolition of the structure--acontention the city disputed.
Warner Bros., which had agreed to cover any additional costs incurred by the
city, wrote the agency, warning that Carrasco was trying "to 'take' the DWP
for all he can." Although still battling for more money, Carrasco began the
job--one in which Alatorre seemed to take an extraordinary interest.
The DWP manager overseeing Carrasco's work, Jeri Ardalan, said Alatorre's
personal involvement was more than he had ever witnessed by a council member
on a construction matter.
"On a contract like that, when the general manager and Alatorre and
everybody are involved, you feel the pressure," he said.
Among other things, Alatorre showed up at the job site with Carrasco and
convened a meeting with DWP executives and staff in his City Hall office to
review lingering contract issues.
In the midst of the payment disputes, Carrasco faxed a letter to the DWP
general manager seeking a $139,000 payment. The cover sheet noted that it
was sent "per Councilman Richard Alatorre." Given the problems Carrasco was
generating, DWP officials again began debating whether to terminate
Carrasco's agreement and rid themselves of a "troublesome and nonresponsive
contractor," according to internal DWP records. But, as one DWP memo warned,
doing so would mean "Alatorre and hence (General Manager) Waters will
probably be upset." Instead, they decided to let the contract move forward,
an action ensuring that "Alatorre and hence Waters is happy." Carrasco's
demands for money did not end with the building's destruction. He sued the
DWP for $350,000 beyond the amount of the original contract, alleging that
the city had required him to perform extra work and had discriminated
against him because of his Latino heritage.
As city lawyers prepared for trial, questions about Carrasco's "erratic
behavior" and possible drug use arose. The deputy city attorney handling the
case prodded Carrasco's former partner to state "whether or not you thought
[Carrasco] was using drugs or something." The ex-partner avoided a direct
response, saying: "I don't want to be any part of that." The city's attorney
declined to say what led him to pursue that line of inquiry.
Eventually, the DWP settled, paying $40,000 to Carrasco's firm, which also
received $80,000 from Warner Bros.
During Alatorre's 1994 deposition in the sexual harassment suit, the
councilman said he could remember helping Carrasco's firm only one time with
the DWP. On that occasion, he said, he tried to expedite a payment the firm
was owed.
Asked whether he contacted the DWP management in that effort, Alatorre
responded: "I'm sure I did, yeah. I don't know. I don't recall at this
time." Dispute Over Transit Business Alatorre also provided Carrasco with
help on another front--JCI's efforts to obtain a piece of the region's
lucrative transit business, according to documents and interviews with key
players.
In late 1991, while the councilman sat on the board of the now-defunct Rapid
Transit District, JCI was one of several firms seeking a $2-million contract
to clean up hazardous waste. The problem was that RTD staff had rejected
Carrasco's bid, partly because his price was too high and he had failed to
provide required information.
"He was validly shot down," said Frank Hanok, then the RTD's assistant
director of procurement.
A staff report recommending another firm was sent to the RTD board for
approval. But at Alatorre's insistence, the board rejected the staff
opinion, allowing Carrasco to file another bid--a move that Hanok said
smacked of improper political tampering.
"Alatorre killed it, sent it back and made sure it went to JCI," Hanok said
of the contract.
Carrasco, in his interview with The Times, said he could not remember
anything about the matter.
Carrasco himself has said that Alatorre, while preparing to become the MTA's
first chairman, helped him navigate the bureaucracy on another transit contract.
In late 1992, Carrasco had filed a formal protest after his firm was
rejected for a multimillion-dollar waste hauling job, records show. Transit
officials had ruled that JCI lacked management and technical expertise.
So he again turned to Alatorre's office, according to testimony Carrasco
gave in the 1994 harassment lawsuit filed against him by his secretary.
Although the contractor's protest ultimately was denied, he testified that
Alatorre used an aide to gather details on competitors' bids for Carrasco.
Carrasco said in an interview Tuesday that he now has no recollection of the
contract, but stressed that any information he may have received on his
competitors was publicly available.
The secret of his success, Carrasco said, was to perform admirably and come
in with the lowest bids.
"That's the only way I got any contracts." Times researcher Janet Lundblad
contributed to this report.
Copyright Los Angeles Times
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Police Spy Fuels Flames Surrounding The Suspension Of Chief Coulbourn Dykes
(A Lengthier Account In The Salisbury, Maryland, 'Daily Times'
By Salisbury's New Mayor, Barrie Parsons Tilghman)
Date: Sun, 14 Jun 1998 16:16:55 -0400
To: DrugSense News Service
From: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org (MAPNews)
Subject: MN: US MD: Police Spy Fuels Flames Surrounding The Suspension Of
Chief Coulbourn Dykes
Sender: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org
Reply-To: owner-mapnews@mapinc.org
Organization: Media Awareness Project http://www.mapinc.org/lists/
Newshawk: Rob Ryan
Pubdate: 3 June 1008
Source: Daily Times, The (MD)
Contact: newsroom@shore.intercom.net
Author: Bryn Mickle
Author: Mayor Barrie Parsons Tilghman
POLICE SPY FUELS FLAMES SURROUNDING THE SUSPENSION OF CHIEF COULBOURN DYKES
Shortly after my election, I became aware the city had withdrawn from the
Wicomico County Narcotics Task Force (WINTF). To my knowledge, the city's
withdrawal had gone unreported in the press, and I therefore sought written
confirmation, which I soon obtained, in the form of letters from Chief
Coulbourn Dykes (April 3) and City Solicitor Robert Eaton (April 15).
Since WINTF has been widely praised as the second-most-effective operation
of its sort in Maryland, I was surprised and distressed to learn of the
city's sudden withdrawal. As I investigated, I became greatly concerned
the city's exit from WINTF was designed to prevent the detection of
mismanagement of public property by the city and its agents.
The city entered into WINTF by written agreement dated Sept. 17, 1987. The
members of the Task Force were the city of Salisbury, the Wicomico County
Sheriff's Department, the State's Attorney for Wicomico County and Maryland
State Police; the towns of Fruitland and Delmar joined the Task Force as
"associate" members.
The formation of WINTF came about in response to the need for cooperative
efforts to halt drug-related crime in the Salisbury metropolitan area.
As WINTF got under way, its funding increasingly depended on confiscated
cash and the sale of property, principally vehicles, seized from drug
dealers. As explained on page seven of the agreement, this property was to
be sold, the proceeds paid over to the Task Force and a careful record of
the transaction made, including the approximate value of the property and
"final disposition or distribution."
Within a year, the responsibility for selling WINTF vehicles, collecting
the proceeds for WINTF, and accounting for the transactions, had been
undertaken by Chief Dykes. Chief Dykes, in turn, entrusted these matters
to Stephen Hitch, a local insurance agent. Although no written agreement
was entered into, Mr. Hitch was authorized by the Chief to sell the
vehicles belonging to WINTF (and in some cases, to the City of Salisbury)
and remit the proceeds; Mr. Hitch was to handle these matters gratuitously,
as a public service.
The Task Force's activities have been managed by an advisory board on which
each participating agency maintains a representative. In 1996, members of
the Task Force advisory board began questioning what was happening to
seized vehicles and the proceeds from their sale. As these questions
became increasingly insistent, an audit team comprised of deputy state's
attorney Sam Vincent, Lt. Doris Schonbrunner of the Sheriff's Department
and City Police Lt. Shelley McKinney was established. (Lt. McKinney
relates her initial SPD assignment was to "spy" on other Task Force members.)
After Lt. McKinney had become outspoken in her criticism of Mr. Hitch's
transactions, Chief Dykes removed her from the audit team and replaced her
with Major Jeff Livingston. (Simultaneously, Chief Dykes relieved Lt.
McKinney of her duties as lieutenant in the criminal investigation division
and assigned her duties involving less responsibility, though at the same
rate of pay and with no demotion in rank.)
In March of this year, the WINTF audit team, by then comprised of Chief
Deputy Kirk Daugherty, Lt. Schonbrunner, MSP Sgt. Ron Petty, Major
Livingston and MSP Lt. Mike Spalding, submitted a report reaching the
following conclusion:
"It is apparent that there were many improprieties that occurred over the
years concerning the selling of forfeited vehicles ... (I)t is quite
evident that there are no standard operating procedures in place concerning
selling and tracking of forfeited vehicles. During the investigation no
consistent rules, guidelines or procedures were located about tracking the
vehicles. It is apparent that once the vehicles left the Task Force
compound, there was no follow-up as to what happened to the vehicles."
At about the same time, (March of this year), Chief Dykes issued an amended
internal directive instructing city police officers to refrain from contact
or communication with the mayor and members of the City Council. The
directive also admonished:
"The Mayor and members of the City Council have no obligation to follow the
chain of command, Mayor to the Chief, before meeting with any employee of
this agency to discuss department policy and/or procedures. If any such
meeting is initiated, the employee will promptly notify the Chief who will
re-establish the chain of command."
On April 27, Lt. McKinney resigned. Since Lt. McKinney is no longer
employed by the City Police Department, she apparently felt at liberty to
communicate directly with elected officials. That same day, she delivered
to then-Council President Carolyn Hall a memo addressed to "The Honorable
members of the Salisbury City Council." I am under the impression Ms. Hall
may not have distributed copies.
As you will see when you review Lt. McKinney's memo, it summarizes the
findings of her investigation of the WINTF vehicle account and her
conclusion "it was more than a poor paper work problem" (page four). I
obtained a copy of Lt. McKinney's memo last week, and, after discussing it
with Lt. McKinney (and obtaining a copy of her investigation notes), became
distressed about the situation generally and in particular her contention
Chief Dykes had ordered WINTF information deleted from Salisbury Police
Department computers (pages 10-14). I have since obtained a copy of the
report produced by the audit team, and am convinced it, viewed in
connection with the other information at our disposal, confirms gross
mismanagement of Task Force property occurred while that property was
entrusted to Chief Dykes.
Chief Dykes, as the city's representative on the Task Force, was charged
with selling vehicles seized by the Task Force and keeping accurate sales
records. However, the vehicles and monies derived from their sale were
mismanaged, and the supporting documentation was at best inadequate and at
worst misleading. Mr. Hitch, the person to whom Chief Dykes had entrusted
these matters, apparently sold the vehicles to associates and acquaintances
for inadequate consideration, exchanged them for personal services and
filmed them in commercials made for his personal business. Assuming, for
present purposes, Chief Dykes knew nothing of this, the situation is
nonetheless one in which the chief established a personal friend in a
position of trust, consigned public property to his care, maintained little
or no oversight, and then reacted angrily and obstructively when attempts
were made to remedy the problems. This situation is particularly
distressing when one considers WINTF was engaged in extremely hazardous law
enforcement activities and was at least partially dependent for its funding
on the monies derived from the sales mismanaged by Mr. Hitch.
To make matters still worse, Chief Dykes and Mr. Eaton have now effectively
brought about the city's exit from the Task Force under circumstances
strongly suggesting the underlying motive was to escape detection. (I am
reliably informed Chief Dykes' explanation to other Task Force members was
he did "not want the Attorney General's office coming down now.")
Of the approximately 180 vehicles seized by the Task Force and entrusted to
Chief Dykes for resale, 36 were identified by the audit team as involving
irregularities. For these 36, the records maintained by Chief Dykes were
substantially incomplete, and for many vehicles no purchase price was
recorded. Two of the vehicles were apparently swapped by Mr. Hitch in
exchange for getting the carpets in his home and insurance office cleaned.
Additionally, several vehicles were used by Mr. Hitch to stage accidents
that were filmed (apparently together with a marked city police car and
perhaps also a uniformed police woman) for TV commercials soliciting
business for Mr. Hitch's insurance agency. A number of the sales made by
Mr. Hitch, purportedly on behalf of the Task Force, resulted in checks
being issued to a fictitious entity, "Salisbury Practical Shooting
Supplies," apparently used by Mr. Hitch as an alter ego.
But by far the majority of the irregularities discovered were simply
transactions in which Mr. Hitch sold Task Force vehicles, at grossly
inadequate prices, to friends and business acquaintances of himself and/or
Chief Dykes. To give you some flavor of the irregularities and
improprieties detected, I will summarize a few.
One of the first irregularities uncovered by the audit efforts was in
connection with a l988 Ford Tempo, seized by the Task Force Jan. 19, 1990,
and identified in the audit report as vehicle #30. In his records, Chief
Dykes assigns an appraised value of $8,000.00 to this vehicle. According to
Lt. McKinney's notes, the city paid off a lien on the vehicle in August of
1990, in the amount of $4,126.88. Chief Dykes' records contain no sales
price figure for this vehicle, and there is no record of any deposit in the
Task Force account in connection with this vehicle. According to MVA
records, however, the car was sold to Warren White, an employee of Mr.
Hitch's insurance agency, Nov. 25, 1992. Though Lt. McKinney's notes
indicate Mr. Hitch, when questioned in November 1997, denied selling the
vehicle to Mr. White, MVA records reflect the vehicle was sold to Mr. White
for $1,800.00. Mr. White, when questioned, stated he had paid for the
vehicle using a Bank of Fruitland check, in the amount of approximately
$1,200.00, with Mr. Hitch paying the balance on his behalf. The only check
Mr. White could produce, however, dated Nov. 25, 1992, was in the amount
of $160.00. After a subpoena had been served on the Bank of Fruitland, Mr.
White's bank accounts were searched, but no check could be located made
payable to Mr. Hitch or WINTF in connection with the purchase of this
vehicle. Because Mr. White was paying less than one-half fair market value
for this vehicle, the MVA required him to produce a bill of sale; at Mr.
White's request, Chief Dykes signed the bill of sale which Mr. White then
used to get the vehicle titled in his name.
A second significant irregularity had to do with a 1988 Mercedes, vehicle
#3 in the audit list, seized by the Task Force April 10, 1996, and assigned
by Chief Dykes an appraised value of $10,000.00. No monies are listed by
Chief Dykes as having been received for this vehicle. According to Lt.
McKinney, Oct. 10, 1997, Chief Dykes informed her, in Mr. Hitch's
presence, "You need to talk with Steve, the Mercedes has not been sold and
is sitting on the car lot." According to Lt. McKinney, Mr. Hitch then told
her there were a lot of problems with the vehicle and it had not yet been
sold. However, the next day, MSP Sgt. Joe Branham of the Task Force
contacted the dealership, Bill Creamer's Used Cars in Baltimore, and
determined the vehicle had been sold. The next day, Mr. Hitch informed
investigators the vehicle had been sold "two weeks ago," though he did not
know for how much. On Nov. 13, 1997, the dealership advised the audit
team they had bought the vehicle from Mr. Hitch three months before, for
$4,000.00, and then promptly sold it for $12,000.00. On December 4, 1997,
Mr. Hitch paid the Task Force the sum of $4,000.00 for this vehicle, using
a check drawn on his "rental account." On Feb. 12, 1998, the audit
investigators spoke with William Creamer, of the car dealership, who stated
Mr. Hitch and a business associate, Al Bowling, had come to the dealership
and picked up $4,000.00 in cash over "the summer of 1997," following which
the dealership resold the vehicle for $12,000.00 Aug. 8.
A third irregularity again involves Mr. Hitch's colleague, Al Bowling. The
vehicle in question, identified as #33 in the audit list, was a 1988
Mercury Couger seized July 28, 1988, and assigned an appraised value of
$12,000.00. Chief Dykes fails to indicate any sales monies received for
this vehicle, and there is no record of any related deposit in the WINTF
account. According to the audit report, Mr. Hitch sold this vehicle to
Carroll's Auto Sales for $400.00; a review of MVA records reflected it is
presently registered in the name of Yvonne Ann Burgess, a Baltimore resident.
Audit investigators interviewed Ms. Burgess Jan. 19, 1998. Ms. Burgess
informed the investigators she had been dating Al Bowling approximately 12
years, and Mr. Bowling had given her the car. According to Ms. Burgess,
Mr. Bowling told her the car was a "repo-ed drug car obtained from Steve
Hitch who had access to state police drug cars." Ms. Burgess explained Mr.
Bowling ran a business financing automobile insurance policies and had been
a business associate of Mr. Hitch for many years. Ms. Burgess informed
the investigator Mr. Hitch had previously loaned her another vehicle, a
white Chevrolet Cavalier.
Another irregularity concerns yet another vehicle in whose sale Mr. Bowling
was involved. This vehicle, #7 on the audit list, was a 1989 Honda Prelude
seized by the Task Force November 23, 1994. This vehicle was assigned an
appraised value of $1,500.00, but no sales monies are shown as having been
received. In July of 1995, the vehicle was sold to Alan Bowling for
$500.00, and Aug. 4, 1995, Chief Dykes signed a bill of sale to Mr.
Bowling; Mr. Bowling's niece, Amelia Bowling, is a member of the Salisbury
City police force.
Another impropriety concerns a 1988 Harley Davidson motorcycle, the subject
of local press several weeks ago. This vehicle, listed as #32 on the audit
list, was seized Nov. 9, 1988 and assigned an appraised value of
$15,000.00. No sales monies are shown to have been received in connection
with this vehicle. In 1994, Sgt. Mark Tyler of the City police obtained
an appraisal indicating that, after repairs, the motorcycle was worth
approximately $9,800.00. Sgt. Tyler offered to purchase the motorcycle
for $10,000.00, but his offer was rejected. MVA records reflect the
vehicle was then sold in July of 1994 to William P. Hearne Jr., a business
associate of Mr. Hitch. The vehicle title, signed by Chief Dykes, reflects
a sales price of $3,500.00; however, the WINTF account reflects two
deposits in connection with this vehicle, one for $3,500.00, described as
the purchase price, and the other for $5,000.00, described as a "donation"
from Mr. Hearne. Moreover, it appears Mr. Hitch was for some reason paid a
commission in the amount of $850.00 for the sale of this vehicle, and the
city and/or WINTF paid approximately $1,100.00 for repairs necessary for
the vehicle to pass inspection.
Another disturbing situation revealed by the audit report concerns several
commercials filmed by Mr. Hitch, using public property, to promote his
insurance agency. These commercials were produced by Comcast; a video of
one of the commercials was obtained via a subpoena served on Comcast by the
state's attorney's office. Two Task Force vehicles, vehicle #15 and 16 on
the audit list, were used in one or more of these commercials. (Actually,
vehicle #15, was titled in the name of the city of Salisbury.) According to
audit investigators, Mr. Hitch visited the city range where these vehicles
were kept, and then, with the assistance of city police officer
Klaverweiden, drove the vehicles from the range to Scenic Drive, where a
marked police car awaited them. Mr. Hitch, presumably with the assistance
of Officer Klaverweiden, "staged" an accident involving the two vehicles,
which was filmed for a commercial in which a marked city police car also
appeared. (According to Lt. McKinney, a uniformed city police officer
appeared in the commercial.) Chief Dykes' records reflect no sales monies
received for either vehicle; on Nov. 12, 1997, Mr. Hitch informed
investigators vehicle #16 was at Carroll's, but when investigators visited
that dealership the next day, they found no trace of the vehicle.
Another distressing incident revealed by the audit team was one in which
Mr. Hitch exchanged two Task Force vehicles in return for having the
carpets in his office and home cleaned. The vehicles involved, listed as
#22 and #34 in the audit report, were a 1983 Toyota truck, for which a
$1,200.00 appraised value was assigned, and a 1984 Nissan, for which a
$3,500.00 appraised value was assigned. Chief Dykes' records reflect no
sales monies received for either vehicle, and no deposit to the WINTF
account has been made for either. The investigation revealed both vehicles
were sold to Dan Dougherty, who Mr. Hitch apparently permitted to take
possession of the vehicles under the impression he would be permitted to
buy both for "a couple of hundred dollars each." Subsequently, Mr. Hitch
informed Mr. Daugherty he expected him to pay for the vehicles by providing
$1,000.00 worth of carpet cleaning at Mr. Hitch's office and residence;
when Mr. Dougherty was interviewed in February of this year, he indicated
he still had $200 to work off.
Yet another irregularity uncovered by the audit investigation had to do
with payments collected by Mr. Hitch via checks made payable to "Salisbury
Practical Shooting Supplies." An inquiry to the Maryland State Department
of Assessments and Taxation reveals there is no corporation, partnership or
trade name registered in this state under that name. According to the
audit report, $2,100.00 was given via a "check paid to Salisbury Practical
Shooting Supply" for four vehicles, #'s 9, 10, 13 and 17 on the audit
listing. (Actually, a photocopy of the check shows it was made payable to
"SPSS," from which I infer the officers who wrote the report were familiar
with Salisbury Practical Shooting and its association with the "SPSS"
acronym.) The $2,100.00 never found its way to the WINTF account, despite
the fact Chief Dykes was apparently identified as the "seller," in
connection with the sale of at least one vehicle, vehicle #9 (a 1984
Chevrolet Citation). Another vehicle, a 1989 Dodge Shadow listed as #36 on
the audit list, was purchased by Thompson's Garage for $550.00 April 15,
1997; the check was made payable to "WINTF," but was never deposited in the
WINTF account. According to the audit report, Mr. Hitch acknowledged
receiving the check, but endorsed it "for deposit only" on behalf of
"Practical Shooting."
In reviewing these irregularities and improprieties, I find it
inconceivable they occurred without Chief Dykes' knowledge. But giving
Chief Dykes the benefit of the doubt, and assuming he was ignorant of these
matters, one wonders how he could have overlooked the mismanagement of
responsibilities entrusted to him, where the mismanagement occurred
virtually under his nose and could have been prevented by the most
elementary supervision. Indeed, had Chief Dykes maintained accurate and
complete records of the vehicle transactions, as the Task Force agreement
(not to mention common sense) dictated, he would quickly have discovered
the irregularities.
The conclusion seems inescapable Chief Dykes handled these matters either
corruptly or incompetently. I propose we take prompt action together to
call for Chief Dykes' resignation or, if he will not resign, his suspension
without pay pending the resolution of charges seeking his termination.
I further propose we direct our legal counsel to contact Lt. McKinney to
determine her wishes concerning possible reinstatement. Also,
(particularly since I am informed Mr. Hitch spent the better part of May
12, 13 and 14 at City Police Headquarters, in conference with Chief Dykes),
I strongly urge we instruct our police personnel Mr. Hitch is no longer
authorized to perform services of any kind on behalf of the city.
Finally: As I stated at the outset, I am concerned the city has
precipitously (and I infer without your approval) withdrawn from the
Narcotics Task Force. I am told the reason given for the city's exit was
concern about legal liability for our officers operating in Task Force
activities inside of the city limits. However, since the city has more
than adequate insurance, and since municipal police departments continually
participate in such activities in Task Forces around the state, I find the
asserted reason unconvincing, and most candidly state I suspect the real
reason for our sudden flight likely was the desire to avoid bad press.
Personally, though I have not yet had an opportunity to assess the Task
Force's general effectiveness, I am under the impression the city is
probably well-served by continued participation in the Task Force, and
would propose we immediately correspond with other Task Force members to
hold in abeyance the withdrawal initiated by Chief Dykes and Mr. Eaton.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
New Revelations - The CIA And Drugs (ANTIFA, An Anti-Fascist Group,
Posts Two Documents, The First An Article From Robert Parry's Newsletter,
'The Consortium,' The Second Former DEA Agent Celerino Castillo's
April 1998 Testimony To The House Permanent Select Committee
On Intelligence)
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 1998 03:53:04 -0700
To: "Chuck's List" (cpconrad@twow.com)
From: "Charles P. Conrad" (cpconrad@twow.com)
Subject: [AFIB] New Revelations: The CIA & Drugs
ANTIFA
INFO - BULLETIN
News * Analysis * Research * Action
***
SPECIAL - June 3, 1998 - EDITION
***
* SPECIAL EDITION *
***
The Truth is that police must "serve and protect;" Reality
is Black youth is shown no respect. The Truth is government
has a "war against drugs;" Reality is government is ruled by
thugs. -- KRS One, R.E.A.L.I.T.Y.
***
NEW REVELATIONS: THE CIA & DRUGS
***
AFIB EDITOR'S NOTE: The texts below from Robert Parry's bi-
weekly newsletter "The Consortium," and former DEA agent
Celerino "Cele" Castillo's April 1998 testimony to the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, provide new
details of CIA and US government complicity with narco-
fascism during the 1980s. Faced by the growing power of
leftist insurgency in today's Colombia, the Clinton
administration is expanding military and logistical support
for that country's drug-tainted terror state. Often in
league with narco-capitalists and right-wing paramilitary
death squads, Colombia's military elite (and the Clinton
administration) are selling increased military "aid" as a
necessary component for expanding the so-called "war against
drugs." But as in Central America during the 1980s,
Washington is forging an unsavory alliance with brutal
killers and drug traffickers in an attempt to prop up a
corrupt authoritarian regime. Describing Washington's role
in Colombia, General Charles Wilhelm, the commander of US
military forces in Latin America told the New York Times:
"This is not a one-night stand. This is marriage for life."
Judging past Pentagon vows of fidelity to "democracy" this
is surely a marriage made in hell...
***
THE CONSORTIUM
For Independent Journalism
Web: http://www.delve.com/consort.html
Tel: (703) 920-1580
E-mail: rparry@ix.netcom.com
- Volume 3, No. 11 (Issue 63) - June 1, 1998 -
***
CONTRA-COCAINE: EVIDENCE OF PREMEDITATION
***
By Robert Parry
***
New evidence, now in the public record, strongly suggests that
the Reagan administration's tolerance of drug trafficking by the
Nicaraguan contras and other clients in the 1980s was
premeditated.
With almost no notice in the national press, a 1982 letter
was introduced into the Congressional Record revealing how CIA
Director William J. Casey secretly engineered an exemption
sparing the CIA from a legal requirement to report on drug
smuggling by agency assets.
The exemption was granted by Attorney General William French
Smith on Feb. 11, 1982, only two months after President Reagan
authorized covert CIA support for the Nicaraguan contra army and
some eight months before the first known documentary evidence
revealing that the contras had started collaborating with drug
traffickers.
The exemption suggests that the CIA's tolerance of illicit
drug smuggling by its clients during the 1980s was official
policy anticipated from the outset, not just an unintended
consequence followed by an ad hoc cover-up.
Before the letter's release, the documentary evidence only
supported the allegation that Ronald Reagan's CIA concealed drug
trafficking by the contras and other intelligence assets in Latin
America. The CIA's inspector general Frederick P. Hitz confirmed
that long-held suspicion in an investigative report issued on
Jan. 29, 1998.
LAUNDRY LIST
But the newly released letter, placed into the Congressional
Record by Rep. Maxine Waters, D-Calif., on May 7, establishes
that Casey foresaw the legal dilemma which the CIA would
encounter should federal law require it to report on illicit
narcotics smuggling by its agents. The narcotics exemption is
especially noteworthy in contrast to the laundry list of crimes
which the CIA was required to disclose.
Under Justice Department regulations, "reportable offenses"
included assault, homicide, kidnapping, Neutrality Act
violations, communication of classified data, illegal
immigration, bribery, obstruction of justice, possession of
explosives, election contributions, possession of firearms,
illegal wiretapping, visa violations and perjury.
Yet, despite reporting requirements for many less serious
offenses, Casey fought a bureaucratic battle in early 1982 to
exempt the CIA from, as Smith wrote, "the need to add narcotics
violations to the list of reportable non-employee crimes."
In his letter, Smith noted that the law provides that "when
requested by the Attorney General, it shall be the duty of any
agency or instrumentality of the Federal Government to furnish
assistance to him for carrying out his functions under" the
Controlled Substances Act.
But Smith agreed that "in view of the fine cooperation the
Drug Enforcement Administration has received from CIA, no formal
requirement regarding the reporting of narcotics violations has
been included in these procedures." [At the time of Smith's
letter, Kenneth Starr was a counselor in the attorney general's
office, although it is not clear whether Starr had any input into
the exemption.]
On March 2, 1982, Casey thanked Smith for the exemption. "I
am pleased that these procedures, which I believe strike the
proper balance between enforcement of the law and protection of
intelligence sources and methods, will now be forwarded to other
agencies covered by them for signing by the heads of the
agencies," Casey wrote.
In the years that followed, "protection of intelligence
sources and methods" apparently became the catch-all excuse for
the CIA's tolerance of South American cocaine smugglers using the
contra war as cover. Though precise volume estimates are
impossible, the contra-connected drug pipeline clearly pumped
tons of cocaine into the United States during the early-to-mid
1980s.
CONTRA UMBRELLA
Some contra defenders have argued that the anti-Sandinista
armies in Honduras and Costa Rica were not the primary
beneficiaries of the narcotics smuggling, that most of the
profits probably went to drug lords with few political interests.
Still, over the past 15 years, substantial evidence has surfaced
revealing that many drug smugglers scurried under the contra
umbrella. They presumably understood that the Reagan
administration would be loath to expose its pet covert action to
negative publicity and possibly even to criminal prosecution.
According to the accumulated evidence, Bolivia's "cocaine
coup" government of 1980-82 was the first in line filling the
contra drug pipeline. But other contra-connected drug operations
soon followed, including the Medellin cartel, the Panamanian
government, the Honduran military and Miami-based anti-Castro
Cubans. The contra-connected cocaine also moved through
transshipment points in Costa Rica and El Salvador. [For details,
see Robert Parry's Lost History; Cocaine Politics by Peter Dale
Scott and Jonathan Marshall; or Gary Webb's forthcoming book,
Dark Alliance.]
Less clear is exactly what the U.S. government knew about
the contra-connected drug trafficking and when. Reagan authorized
CIA support for the contra army in mid-December 1981. But the
first publicly known case of contra cocaine shipments appeared in
government files in an Oct. 22, 1982, cable from the CIA's
Directorate of Operations.
The cable passed on word that U.S. law enforcement agencies
were aware of "links between (a U.S. religious organization) and
two Nicaraguan counter-revolutionary groups [which] involve an
exchange in (the United States) of narcotics for arms." The
material in parentheses was inserted by the CIA as part of its
declassification of the cable. The name of the religious group
remains secret.
Over the next several years, the CIA learned of other
suspected links between the contras and drug trafficking. In
1984, the CIA even intervened with the Justice Department to
block a criminal investigation into a suspected contra role in a
San Francisco-based drug ring, according to Hitz's report.
In December 1985, Brian Barger and I wrote the first news
article disclosing that virtually every Nicaraguan contra group
had links to drug trafficking. In that Associated Press dispatch,
we noted that the CIA knew of at least one case of cocaine
profits filtering into the contra war effort, but that DEA
officials in Washington claimed they had never been told of any
contra tie-in. The Casey exemption explains why that was
possible.
After the AP story ran, the Reagan administration attacked
it as unfounded and the article was largely ignored by the rest
of the Washington press corps. But it did help spark an
investigation by Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., who over the next two
years amassed substantial evidence of cocaine smuggling in and
around the contra war. Still, the Reagan and Bush administrations
continued to disparage Kerry's probe and its many witnesses.
Through the end of the decade, the mainstream Washington
media also denigrated the allegations. In April 1989, when Kerry
released a lengthy report detailing multiple examples of how the
contra war supplied cover for major drug trafficking operations,
the nation's most prestigious newspapers -- The New York Times,
The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times -- published only
brief, dismissive accounts.
With the end of the contra war in 1990, the controversy
faded further into the historical recesses. The Clinton
administration quietly rescinded Casey's narcotics exemption in
1995.
CRACK EPIDEMIC
The contra-cocaine issue arose again in 1996 with an
investigative series by Gary Webb of the San Jose Mercury-News.
Those stories traced how one of the contra drug conduits helped
fuel the crack epidemic in Los Angeles.
In response, the major newspapers again rallied to the CIA's
defense. They denounced the series as overblown, although finally
acknowledging that the allegations raised during the 1980s were
true. Webb's series also prompted a new investigation by the
CIA's inspector general.
In the first volume of his investigative report, Hitz
admitted the CIA knew early on about contra drug trafficking and
covered it up. The report's second volume reportedly puts the CIA
in even a worse light.
The CIA press office acknowledges that the second volume has
been completed, but adds that there is no timetable for releasing
a declassified version. "They'll only let it out if they're
pressured," commented one U.S. official.
But the CIA apparently is counting on continued disinterest
by the national press as a sign that there is no need to revisit
the issue. That assessment was bolstered on May 7 when Waters
introduced the Casey-Smith letters into the Congressional Record
and drew very little media interest in the damaging admissions.
For her part, Waters stated that the Casey-Smith arrangement
"allowed some of the biggest drug lords in the world to operate
without fear that the CIA would be required to report their
activities to the DEA and other law enforcement agencies. ...
These damning memorandums ... are further evidence of a shocking
official policy that allowed the drug cartels to operate through
the CIA-led contra covert operations in Central America."
Though Waters's comments focused on the contra war, Casey's
narcotics exemption could have had other CIA covert operations in
mind. In the early 1980s, the CIA-backed Afghan mujahedeen also
were implicated as major heroin traffickers in the Near East.
But whatever the genesis of the drug exemption, the
Casey-Smith exchange of letters stands as important historical
evidence bolstering the long-denied allegations of CIA complicity
in drug trafficking. Worse yet, the documents are evidence of
premeditation.
Copyright (c) 1998
CONSORTIUM ON-LINE OR MAIL SUBSCRIPTIONS
ON LINE: 1 year (26 issues) - $10. Visa or Mastercard: 1-
800-738-1812; active passwords with each issue.
NEWSLETTER FORMAT: 1 year - (26 issues) $39; 6 months (13
issues) - $24.
I.F. MAGAZINE: a bi-monthly publication featuring the best
stories from The Consortiun (six issues) for $25.
THE MEDIA CONSORTIUM
Suite 102-231
2200 Wilson Blvd.
Arlington, VA 22201
***
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF CELERINO CASTILLO III, (D.E.A., RETIRED)
FOR THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
April 27, 1998
***
Source: http://www.copvcia.com/contra~1.htm
Celerino "Cele" Castillo III Author: "POWDERBURNS" Cocaine,
Contras & The Drug War; 2709 N. 28 1/2 St., McAllen, Texas
78501 Tele/Fax: 956-631-3818 Pager: 956-318-4913; E-Mail:
cc3@hiline.net
***
For several years, I fought in the trenches of the front
lines of Reagan's "Drug War", trying to stamp out what I
considered American's greatest foreign threat. But, when I was
posted, in Central and South America from 1984 through 1990, I
knew we were playing the "Drug War Follies." While our government
shouted "Just Say No !", entire Central and South American
nations fell into what are now known as, "Cocaine democracies."
While with the DEA, I was able to keep journals of my
assignments in Central and South America. These journals include
names, case file numbers and DEA NADDIS (DEA Master Computer)
information to back up my allegations. I have pictures and
original passports of the victims that were murdered by CIA
assets. These atrocities were done with the approval of the
agencies.
We, ordinary Americans, cannot trust the C.I.A. Inspector
General to conduct a full investigation into the CIA or the DEA.
Let me tell you why. When President Clinton (June, 1996) ordered
The Intelligence Oversight Board to conduct an investigation into
allegations that US Agents were involved in atrocities in
Guatemala, it failed to investigate several DEA and CIA
operations in which U.S. agents knew before hand that individuals
(some Americans) were going to be murdered.
I became so frustrated that I forced myself to respond to
the I.O.B report citing case file numbers, dates, and names of
people who were murdered. In one case (DEA file # TG-86-0005)
several Colombians and Mexicans were raped, tortured and murdered
by CIA and DEA assets, with the approval of the CIA. Among those
victims identified was Jose Ramon Parra-Iniguez, Mexican passport
A-GUC-043 and his two daughters Maria Leticia Olivier-Dominguez,
Mexican passport A-GM-8381. Also included among the dead were
several Colombian nationals: Adolfo Leon Morales-Arcilia "a.k.a."
Adolfo Morales-Orestes, Carlos Alberto Ramirez, and Jiro
Gilardo-Ocampo. Both a DEA and a CIA agent were present, when
these individuals were being interrogated (tortured).
The main target of that case was a Guatemalan Congressman,
(Carlos Ramiro Garcia de Paz) who took delivery of 2,404 kilos of
cocaine in Guatemala just before the interrogation. This case
directly implicated the Guatemalan Government in drug trafficking
(The Guatemalan Congressman still has his US visa and continues
to travel at his pleasure into the US). To add salt to the wound,
in 1989 these murders were investigated by the U.S Department of
Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility. DEA S/I Tony
Recevuto determined that the Guatemalan Military Intelligence,
G-2 (the worst human rights violators in the Western Hemisphere)
was responsible for these murders. Yet, the U.S. government
continued to order U.S. agents to work hand-in-hand with the
Guatemalan Military. This information was never turned over to
the I.O.B. investigation. (See attached response)
I have obtained a letter, dated May 28, 1996, from the DEA
administrator, to U.S. Congressman Lloyd Doggett (D), Texas. In
this letter, the administrator flatly lies, stating that DEA
agents "have never engaged in any joint narcotics programs with
the Guatemalan Military".
I was there. I was the leading Agent in Guatemala. 99.9% of
DEA operations were conducted with the Guatemalan military. In
1990, the DEA invited a Guatemalan military G-2 officer, Cpt.
Fuentez, to attend a DEA narcotic school, which is against DEA
policy. I know this for a fact because I worked with this officer
for several years and was in Guatemala when he was getting ready
to travel to the States.
Facts of my investigation on CIA-Contras drug trafficking in
El Salvador:
The key to understanding the "crack cocaine" epidemic, which
exploded on our streets in 1984, lies in understanding the effect
of congressional oversight on covert operations. In this case the
Boland amendment(s) of the era, while intending to restrict
covert operations as intended by the will of the People, only
served to encourage C.I.A., the military and elements of the
national intelligence community to completely bypass the Congress
and the Constitution in an eager and often used covert policy of
funding prohibited operations with drug money.
As my friend and colleague Michael Ruppert has pointed out
through his own experience in the 1970s, CIA has often bypassed
congressional intent by resorting to the drug trade (Vietnam,
Laos, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc).
When the Boland Amendment(s) cut the Contras off from a
continued U.S. government subsidy, George Bush, his national
security adviser Don Gregg, and Ollie North, turned to certain
foreign governments, and to private contributions, to replace
government dollars. Criminal sources of contributions were not
excluded. By the end of 1981, through a series of Executive
Orders and National Security Decision Directives, many of which
have been declassified, Vice President Bush was placed in charge
of all Reagan administration intelligence operations. All of the
covert operations carried out by officers of the CIA, the
Pentagon, and every other federal agency, along with a rogue army
of former intelligence operatives and foreign agents, were
commanded by George Bush. Gary Webb (San Jose Mercury News)
acknowledged, that he simply had not traced the command structure
over the Contras up into the White House, although he had gotten
some indications that the operation was not just CIA.
On Dec. 01, 1981, President Ronald Reagan signed a secret
order authorizing the CIA to spend $19.9 million for covert
military aid to the recently formed Contras -- hardly enough
money to launch a serious military operation against the Cuban
and Soviet-backed Sandinista regime.
In August 1982, George Bush hired Donald P. Gregg as his
principal adviser for national security affairs. In late 1984,
Gregg introduced Oliver North to Felix Rodriguez, (a retired CIA
agent) who had already been working in Central America for over a
year under Bush's direction. Gregg personally introduced
Rodriguez to Bush on Jan. 22, 1985. Two days after his January
1985 meeting, Rodriguez went to El Salvador and made arrangements
to set up his base of operations at Ilopango air base. On Nov.
01, 1984, the FBI arrested Rodriguez's partner, Gerard Latchinian
and convicted him of smuggling $10.3 million in cocaine into the
U.S.
On Jan. 18, 1985, Rodriguez allegedly met with money-
launderer Ramon Milan-Rodriguez, who had moved $1.5 billion for
the Medellin cartel. Milan testified before a Senate
Investigation on the Contras' drug smuggling, that before this
1985 meeting, he had granted Felix Rodriguez's request and given
$10 million from the cocaine for the Contras.
On September 10, 1985, North wrote in his Notebook:
Introduced by Wally Grasheim/Litton, Calero/Bermudez visit
to Ilopango to estab. log support./maint. (...)
In October of 1985, Upon my arrival in Guatemala, I was
forewarned by Guatemala DEA, County Attache, Robert J. Stia, that
the DEA had received intelligence that the Contras out of
Salvador, were involved in drug trafficking. For the first time,
I had come face to face with the contradictions of my assignment.
The reason that I had been forewarned was because I would be the
Lead Agent in El Salvador.
DEA Guatemalan informant, Ramiro Guerra (STG-81-0013) was in
place in Guatemala and El Salvador on "Contra" intelligence. At
the time (early 80's), he was a DEA fugitive on "Rico"
(Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organizations) and "CCE"
(Continuing Criminal Enterprise) charges out of San Francisco. In
1986, he became an official advisor for the DEA trained El
Salvador Narcotics Task Force. In 1989, all federal charges were
dropped because of his cooperation with the DEA in Central
America. Guerra is still a DEA informant in Guatemala.
December 1985, CNN reporter Brian Barger broke the story of
the Contra's involved in drug trafficking.
NOTES FROM MY JOURNALS & INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
January 13, 1986, I wrote a report on El Salvador under DEA
file (GFTG-86-9145).
January 16, 1986---HK-1217W--Carlos Siva and Tulio Pedras
Contra pilots.
January 23, 1986, GFTG-86-9999, Air
Intelligence in "El Salvador" TG-86-0003, Samana and Raul.
In 1986, I placed an informant (Mario Murga) at the Ilopango
airport in El Salvador. He was initiated and wrote the flight
plans for most Contra pilots. After their names were submitted
into NADDIS, it was revealed that most pilots had already been
document in DEA files as traffickers. (See DEA memo by me date
2-14-89.)
Feb. 05, 1986, I had seized $800,000.00 in cash, 35 kilos of
cocaine, and an airplane at Ilopango. DEA # TG-86-0001;
Gaitan-Gaitan, Leonel
March 24, 1986, I wrote a DEA report on the Contra
operation. (GFTG-86-4003, Frigorificos de Puntarenas, S.A), US
registration aircraft N-68435 (Cessna 402).
April 17, 86, I wrote a Contra report on Arturo Renick;
Johnny Ramirez (Costa Rica). Air craft TI-AQU & BE-60..
GFTG-86-9999; Air Intelligence.
April 25,26 1986--I met with CIA Felix Vargas in El Salvador
(GFTG-86-9145).
April of 1986, The Consul General of the U.S Embassy in El
Salvador (Robert J. Chavez), warned me that CIA agent George
Witters was requesting a U.S visa for a Nicaraguan drug
trafficker and Contra pilot by the name of Carlos Alberto Amador.
(mentioned in 6 DEA files)
May 14, 1986, I spoke to Jack O'Conner DEA HQS Re: Matta-
Ballesteros. (NOTE: Juan Ramon Matta-Ballesteros was perhaps the
single largest drug trafficker in the region. Operating from
Honduras he owned several companies which were openly sponsored
and subsidized by C.I.A.)
May 26, 1986, Mario Rodolfo Martinez-Murga became an
official DEA informant (STG-86-0006). Before that, he had been a
sub-source for Ramiro Guerra and Robert Chavez. Under Chavez,
Murga's intelligence resulted in the seizure of several hundred
kilos of cocaine, (from Ilopango to Florida) making Murga a
reliable source of information.
May 27, 1986, I Met U.S. Army Lt. Col. Alberto Adame in El
Salvador. Has knowledge of the Contra Operation at Ilopango. He
was in El Salvador from 1984 thru 1987.
On June 06, 1986, I send a DEA report/telex cable to
Washington DEA in regards to Contra pilots, Carlos Amador and
Carlos Armando Llamos (Honorary Ambassador from El Salvador to
Panama) (N-308P). Llamos had delivered 4 1/2 million dollars to
Panama from Ilopango for the Contras. Information was gathered by
informant Mario Murga. Leon Portilla-TIANO = Navojo 31 &
YS-265-American Pilot: Francisco Viaud. Roberto Gutierrez
(N-82161) Mexican (X-AB)
June 10, 1998, I spoke to CIA agent Manny Brand Re: Sofi
Amoury (Cuban Contra operator and Guatemalan Galvis-Pena in
Guatemala.
June 16, 1986-GFTG-86-9999, Air Intel (DEA-6) El Salvador
Early part of 1986, I received a telex/cable from DEA Costa
Rica. SA Sandy Gonzales requested for me to investigate hangers 4
and 5 at Ilopango. DEA Costa Rica had received reliable
intelligence that the Contras were flying cocaine into the
hangars. Both hangers were owned and operated by the CIA and the
National Security Agency. Operators of those two hangars were,
Lt. Col. Oliver North and CIA contract agent, Felix Rodriguez,
"a.k.a." Max Gomez. (See attached letter by Bryan Blaney
(O.I.C.), dated March 28, 1991).
June 18, 1986, Salvadoran Contra pilot, Francisco "Chico"
Guirrola-Beeche (DEA NADDIS # 1585334 and 1744448) had been
documented as a drug trafficker. On this date, at 7:30a.m, he
departed Ilopango to the Bahamas to air drop monies. On his
return trip (June 21) Guirrola arrived with his passengers
Alejandro Urbizu & Patricia Bernal. In 1988 Urbizu was arrested
in the US in a Cocaine conspiracy case. In 1985 Guirrola was
arrested in South Texas (Kleberg County) with 5 and 1/2 million
dollars cash, which he had picked up in Los Angeles, California.
(U.S. Customs in Dallas/Ft. Worth had case on him.)
June 18, 1986, DEA 6 on Air Intelligence, GFTG- 86-9999; El
Salvador.
June 27 & 28, 1986, US Lt. Col. Albert Adame spoke with US
Ambassador Edwin Corr re: Narcotics.
In a July 26, 1986 report to the Congress, on contra-related
narcotics allegation, The State Department described the Frogman
CASE as follows, "This case gets it's nickname from swimmers who
brought cocaine ashore in San Francisco on a Colombian vessel."
It focused on a major Colombian cocaine smuggler, ALVARO
CARVAJAL-MINOTA, who supplied a number of west coast smugglers.
It was further alleged that Nicaraguan Contra, Horacio Pererita,
was subsequently convicted on drug charges in Costa Rica and
sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. Two other members of the
organization were identified as Nicaraguans Carlos Cabezas &
Julio Zavala. They were among the jailed West Coast traffickers
and convicted of receiving drugs from Carvajal. They claimed long
after their convictions, that they had delivered sums of monies
to Contra resistance groups in Costa Rica.
July 28, 1986, I Met with CIA agents Don Richardson, Janice
Elmore and Lt. Col. Adame in El Salvador.
July 29, 1986, I Met with Don Richardson and Robert Chavez
at the US Embassy in El Salvador.
August 03, 1986, Ramiro Guerra, Lt. Col. A. Adame, Dr.
Hector Regalado (Dr. Death, who claimed to have shot Archbishop
Romero) and myself went out on patrol in El Salvador.
In Aug. 1986, The Kerry Committee requested information on
the Contra pilots from the DEA. The Department Of Justice flatly
refused to give up any information.
Aug. 15, 1986, I spoke to CIA (Chief of Station) Jack
McCavett and Don Richardson; El Salvador; Re: Fernando Canelas
Sanez from Florida.
Aug. 18, 1986, I received $45,000.00 in cash from CIA Chief
of Station (CIA), Jack McKavett for the purchase of vehicles for
the DEA El Salvador Narcotic Task Force.
Aug. 28, 1986, I had a meeting with El Salvador US
Ambassador, Edwin Corr, in regards to Wally Grasheim, Pete's
Place and Carlos Amador (3:00 p.m.)
Oscar Alvarado-Lara "a.k.a." El Negro Alvarado (CIA asset
and Contra pilot) was mentioned in 3 DEA files. On June 11, 1986,
Alvarado transported 27 illegal Cubans to El Salvador Ilopango,
where they were then smuggled into Guatemala. On Sept. 28, 1987,
Alvarado picked up CIA officer Randy Capister in Puerto Barrios
Guatemala after a joint DEA, CIA and Guatemala Military (G-2)
operation. Several Mexicans and Colombians were murdered and
raped. This was supported by the CIA. DEA File TG-86-0005.
1986, DEA El Salvador, initiated a file on Walter L.
Grasheim (TG-87-0003). He is mentioned in several DEA, FBI and
U.S Customs files. This DEA file is at The National Archives in
The Iran-Contra file in Washington D.C (bulky # 2316). Also see
attached Top Secret/Declassified Record of Interview on Mr.
Grasheim, by the Office of Independent Counsel, dated Jan. 03,
1991.
Sept. 01, 1986, at approximately 5:00pm, I received a phone
call in Guatemala from (C.I) Ramiro Guerra, Re: Raid at Wally's
house in El Salvador Wally's plane (N-246-J).
On September 01, 1986, Walter Grasheim (a civilian)
residence in El Salvador was searched by the DEA Task Force.
Found at the residence was an arsenal of US military munitions,
(allegedly for a Contra military shipment). Found were cases of
C-4 explosives, grenades, ammunition, sniper rifles, M-16's,
helicopter helmets and knives. Also found were files of payment
to Salvadoran Military Officials (trips to New York City). Found
at his residence were radios and license plates belonging to the
US Embassy. We also found an M16 weapon belonging to the US
Mil-Group Commander, Col. Steel. Prior to the search, I went to
every department of the U.S. Embassy and asked if this individual
worked in any way shape or form with the embassy. Every head of
the departments denied that he worked for them. A pound of
marijuana and marijuana plants growing in the back yard, were
also found.
Sept. 02, 1986, I departed Guatemala on Taca Airlines @
7:30a.m to El Salvador.
Sept. 26, 1986, Meeting with Col. Steel Re: Mr. Grasheim
(Col. Steel admitted that he had given an M-16 to Grasheim) and
CIA George W. Also talked to Don Richardson (CIA) re: Ramiro
Guerra. Talked to Col. Adame Re: CIA George.
October 03, 1986, Spoke to DEA Panama re: Mr. Grasheim. Was
advised to be careful.
October 15, 1986, Asst. Atty. Gen. Mark Richard testified
before the Kerry Committee, that he had attended a meeting with
20 to 25 officials and that the DEA did not want to provide any
of the information the committee had requested on the Contra
involvement in drug trafficking.
October 21, 1986, I send a Telex/cable to Washington D.C on
the Contras.
October 22, 1986 talked to El Salvador Re: Grasheim.
October 23, 1986, HK-1960P Honduras. 1,000 kilos of cocaine.
DEA- 6 was written on this case.
October 29, 1986 Talked to DEA HQS (John Martch) re Contras
& Grasheim.
October 30, 1986, Talked to Salvadoran Gen. Blandon re: to
Mr. Grasheim.
Nov. 07, 1986, Talked to John Martch 202-786-4356 and
Azzam-633-1049; Home: 301-262-1007. (Contras).
Nov. 13, 1986, I Met with Ambassador Corr @2:00pm re: Mr.
Grasheim. (He stated, "let the chips fall where they may." Met w/
Lt. Col. Adame.
November 14, 1986, Met with Salvadoran Col. Villa Marona re:
Mr. Grasheim. He advised that the U.S Embassy had approved for
Grasheim to work at Ilopango.
On January 20, 1987, Joel Brinkley (special to the New York
Times) reported. "Contra Arms Crew said To Smuggle Drugs" The 3rd
secret had surfaced. Brinkley wrote: "Fed. Drug investigators
uncovered evidence last fall that the American flight crews which
covertly carried arms to the Nicaraguan rebels were smuggling
cocaine and other drugs on their return trips back to the US.
Administration Officials said today that when the crew members,
based in El Salvador, learned that DEA agents were investigating
their activities, one of them warned that they had White House
protection. The Times then quoted an anonymous US official who
said the crew member's warnings which came after DEA searched his
San Salvador house for drugs, caused 'quite a stir' at Ilopango."
Feb. 09, 1987, I had meeting with Lt. Col. Adame and Elmore
re: major argument with DEA HQS I.A. Lourdez Border. They had
just arrived in Guatemala for a two-day fact finding tour of El
Salvador.
Feb. 10, 1987, I met with U.S. Ambassador Corr (Salvador) re
DEA HQS Intel. Analyst Lourdez Border and Doug (last name
unknown) - both were rookies. In two days in El Salvador, they
determined that there was no contra involvement in drug
trafficking.
February 27. 1987, I spoke to Mike Alston, DEA Miami, RE:
Contra pilots John Hall; Bruce Jones' airstrip in Costa Rica,
Colombian Luis Rodriguez; Mr. Shrimp-Ocean Hunter Costa Rica to
Miami. Contra Operation from Central American to U.S.
March 03,